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In two studies, we examined how individual differences in causal uncer-
tainty (CU), causal importance (CI), and initial attitudes affected the pro-
cessing of a persuasive message that contained causal or non–causal
arguments. We predicted that high CU individuals’ doubts about their
causal understanding of events would be activated when they were pre-
sented with counterattitudinal arguments. When these individuals also
placed a high value on causal understanding (high CI), they should scruti-
nize any available causal explanations. As a result, they should be more
persuaded by strong compared to weak causal arguments. In support of
these predictions, we found in two studies that high CU/high CI partici-
pants were more persuaded by strong compared to weak counterat-
titudinal causal arguments. Mediational analyses in Study 2 revealed that
high CU/high CI participants were more persuaded by strong causal ar-
guments because they were more confident in them. Implications for the
CU model and persuasion processes are discussed.
Social psychologists long have been interested in how people understand the causes
of events in the social world. Early attribution theorists argued that in order to predict
and control their social environments, people attribute behavior and events to stable,
underlying causes (Heider, 1958). This early work and subsequent research has pro-
vided us with a wealth of information about attribution processes (for a review see
Gilbert, 1998) and the critical role they play in many different domains.
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Recently, researchers have begun to examine the effectiveness of including causal
explanations in persuasive messages. Specifically, Slusher and Anderson (1996) com-
pared the effectiveness of causal and non–causal arguments in changing people’s be-
liefs about the transmission of AIDS. Both types of arguments asserted correctly that
AIDS could not be transmitted through casual contact. However, the causal argu-
ments explained the underlying mechanism responsible for AIDS transmission,
whereas the non–causal arguments provided covariation data supporting the lack of
association between AIDS and casual contact. Participants who received the causal
arguments, either alone or along with the non–causal arguments, showed greater be-
lief change than did participants who received only the non–causal arguments.
Causal arguments, then, appear to have great potential in persuasive communi-
cation. However, their effectiveness for producing long lasting attitude change
likely depends on the extent to which individuals think carefully about them (Petty
& Cacioppo, 1986). One factor that is known to influence the amount of message
elaboration is the match between characteristics of the persuasive message and
perceivers’ self–schemas, social identities, attitude bases, or attitude functions (for
reviews see Briñol & Petty, 2006; Petty, Wheeler, & Bizer, 2000). For instance, re-
searchers have examined the extent to which participants’ attitudes are influenced
by argument quality (i.e., strong versus weak arguments) when they receive mes-
sages that are matched or mismatched to their levels of self–monitoring, extrover-
sion, or need for cognition (Petty & Wegener, 1998; Wheeler, Petty, & Bizer, 2005).
Larger argument quality effects have been observed for matched messages,
indicating that greater message elaboration occurs under these conditions.
In the current research, we sought to examine how individual differences in
causal uncertainty (CU) could affect the processing of causal arguments. CU refers
to doubts about one’s own ability to identify the underlying causes of events
(Weary & Edwards, 1996). According to the CU model (Weary & Edwards, 1996), a
frequent loss of perceived control over events in one’s life can lead to chronically ac-
cessible, generalized beliefs that one’s understanding of the social world might be
inadequate. Once such beliefs have developed, then unexpected or ambiguous
events can easily trigger CU feelings because, by definition, these types of events
signal that one’s ability to predict and control events is somewhat inadequate.
Weary and Edwards (1996) argue that when their CU beliefs are activated, high
CU individuals often will try to regain a sense of causal understanding and control
by engaging in thorough information gathering and processing strategies. In sup-
port of this idea, studies have found that compared to those with low CU, high CU
participants expend more effort on an impression formation task (Jacobson, 1999)
and select more diagnostic questions to ask an interaction partner (Weary & Jacob-
son, 1997). Additionally, some initial evidence exists to support the idea that CU can
affect the processing of a persuasive message. Specifically, Edwards (2003) found
that although high levels of CU were not sufficient to prompt elaborative process-
ing, high levels of CU in conjunction with a rational decision-making style in-
creased the amount of thought that individuals devoted to a counterattitudinal
persuasive message. In his study, participants who were high in both CU and the
judging dimension of the Myers–Briggs Type Indicator listed more thoughts about
a message concerning senior comprehensive exams and based their attitudes more
on the quality of the arguments, relative to those low in CU or judging.
Edwards’ (2003) findings likely were due in part to the counterattitudinal nature
of the message. High CU individuals typically engage in extensive processing only
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when some aspect of the situation activates their CU beliefs. To the extent that indi-
viduals possess attitude–congruent knowledge, counterattitudinal appeals intro-
duce unexpected associations. For example, students who dislike exams probably
would not have expected a new exam policy to be beneficial. Such unexpected asso-
ciations should have triggered greater uncertainty among individuals with chroni-
cally accessible CU beliefs (Riley, 1998) and resulted in greater processing of the
message, at least when a rational decision-making style also was adopted.
The CU model suggests another potential moderator of CU beliefs and feelings that
should have particular relevance to the processing of causal counterattitudinal argu-
ments: causal importance (CI), or the importance that individuals place upon accu-
rate causal understanding. Weary and Edwards (1996) argued that although accurate
causal understanding generally facilitates successful adaptation to one’s environ-
ment, levels of CI can vary from individual to individual and from situation to situa-
tion. Conceptually, CU and CI are distinct constructs. Valuing a domain (i.e., high CI)
does not necessarily give one confidence in one’s abilities in that domain. Similarly,
doubting one’s abilities in a domain (i.e., high CU) does not necessarily make that do-
main seem any less important, particularly when it is critical for survival. What, then,
determines a person’s level of CI? Desire for control and high costs associated with a
lack of causal understanding both have been suggested as factors likely to result in in-
creased CI levels (Weary, Tobin, & Edwards, in press). Whatever its antecedents,
high levels of CI should increase sensitivity to less–than–desired levels of causal
understanding and result in intensified uncertainty resolution efforts.
Accordingly, we predicted that individuals who were high in both CU and CI
would have the highest need to resolve uncertainty brought about by a
counterattitudinal message. They should assess quickly whether reading the mes-
sage carefully would help them achieve this goal (Weary & Edwards, 1996). If they
detect causal cues (i.e., “because”), they should expend their cognitive resources on
processing the message carefully. As a result of their greater attention, high
CU/high CI individuals should be more persuaded by strong compared to weak
causal arguments.
High CU/low CI participants, on the other hand, should be willing to tolerate
small amounts of uncertainty. Thus, we would not expect high CU/low CI partici-
pants to think carefully about causal arguments. Finally, low CU participants
should not experience CU feelings to the same extent as high CU participants, so
they should have little need to attend to causal arguments.
In Study 1, we assessed participants’ initial attitudes and chronic levels of CU and
CI, and manipulated the type (causal or non–causal) and quality (strong or weak) of
persuasive arguments to which they were exposed. In Study 2, we held constant ini-
tial attitude (inconsistent with the position of the message) and argument type
(causal) and manipulated the quality of the causal explanations. We also assessed
confidence in the author’s explanations as a potential mediator. We predicted that
high CU/high CI participants would feel more confident in the strong compared to
weak causal arguments, and as a result, would be more persuaded (Petty, Briñol, &
Tormala, 2002).
STUDY 1
In Study 1, we presented participants with a persuasive message against the legal-
ization of gambling in Ohio. We manipulated the quality (strong or weak) and type
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(causal or non–causal) of arguments. We predicted that when the arguments were
counterattitudinal, as would be the case for participants initially in favor of gam-
bling, high levels of CU and CI would lead participants to attend carefully to the
causal arguments. As a result, these participants would be more persuaded by
strong compared to weak causal arguments.
Before presenting the details of Study 1, however, we first describe a number of
pilot studies that were conducted to (a) establish a reliable measure of CI and (b)
create strong and weak versions of our causal and non–causal arguments.
PILOT STUDIES 1–3
Causal Importance (CI)
Previous research on CI has utilized a single–item measure of the construct (Weary,
Jacobson, Edwards, & Tobin, 2001). We sought to develop a more reliable measure
of CI for use in the current studies. Accordingly, we conducted a series of three pilot
studies. In the first study, 293 participants completed the 14–item Causal Uncer-
tainty Scale (CUS; Weary & Edwards, 1994) and 11 items designed to tap CI. We
conducted exploratory factor analyses on these items and chose the six best CI
items. In the second study, we administered the CUS and six CI items, along with
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1967) and the Need for Cognition Scale
(NCS; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) to 628 participants. We conducted confirma-
tory factor analyses on the CU and CI items, and examined the associations between
CU, CI, BDI, and NCS scores. Lastly, in the third study, we administered the six CI
items to 79 participants twice, separated by a seven–week interval, in order to
examine test–retest reliability.
Pilot Study 1
In the first pilot study, 107 male and 186 female participants completed the CUS
(Weary & Edwards, 1994) and 11 items that were designed to tap CI. The CUS con-
sists of 14 statements expressing beliefs that one does not understand the causes of
positive and negative events that happen to oneself and others (i.e., “I do not under-
stand what causes most of the good things that happen to me”). The CI items also
referenced good and bad events happening to the self and others, but asked partici-
pants how important they thought it was to understand the underlying causes (i.e.,
“It is important to know the causes for a person’s behavior”). Participants rated on
6–point scales the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each statement.
Using CEFA software (Browne, Cudeck, Tateneni, & Mels, 1998), we conducted
exploratory factor analyses on the 25 items using maximum likelihood estimation
and oblique varimax rotations. Prior factor analyses of the CUS have revealed that it
consists of two highly correlated factors: CU about one’s own and other people’s
outcomes (Edwards, Weary, & Reich, 1998). We wanted to see if the CI items would
form a third distinct factor. An examination of the eigenvalues (6.50, 3.40, 1.50, 1.40,
1.10, 1.00, and so on) suggested that a 2– or 3–factor solution might be reasonable.
We tested the fit of 1-, 2-, and 3–factor models by comparing root mean square er-
ror of approximation (RMSEA) values and examining factor loadings. RMSEA val-
ues greater than .10 indicate unacceptable model fit, values from .08–.10 indicate
mediocre fit, values from .05–.08 indicate reasonable fit, and values < .05 indicate
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close fit. Our analyses revealed that a 1–factor model provided unacceptable fit
(RMSEA = .112), whereas 2–factor (RMSEA = .078) and 3–factor (RMSEA = .066)
models both fit the data reasonably well. In both the 2- and 3-factor models, a single
CI factor emerged that was uncorrelated with the CU factor(s), rs ranged from –.03
to –.08. In the 2–factor model, the CU items loaded on a single CU factor. In the
3–factor model, the CU items loaded on two factors (own and other outcomes) that
were positively correlated, r = .57, replicating the patterns reported by Edwards et
al. (1998).1
From the larger set of 11 CI items, we selected the six items with the highest load-
ings (> .40) on the CI factor. These items were, “I feel like it is important to be able to
determine the actual cause or causes of events in my life,” “Understanding what
causes different events in my life is not crucial for my success and happiness” (re-
versed); “It would benefit me greatly if I could better understand the causes of
events in my life”; “It is important to know the causes for a person’s behavior”;
“When something good happens to me, it is important to know why it happened”;
and “When something bad happens to me, it is important to know why it
happened.”
We conducted a second set of exploratory factor analyses on the reduced set of
items (14 CU and the six CI). Again, we found that the 1–factor model did not fit the
data well (RMSEA = .129), whereas the 2–factor (RMSEA = .087) and 3–factor
(RMSEA = .07) models provided mediocre and reasonable levels of fit, respectively.
In addition, the CI items loaded on a single factor that was uncorrelated with the CU
factor(s), rs ranged from –.01 to –.08. Overall, the exploratory factor analyses sug-
gest that a 3–factor model best explains the relationships among the 14 CU and six
CI items.2
Pilot Study 2
In the second study, we sought to replicate the factor structure from the exploratory
factor analysis and to provide some convergent and discriminant validity for the
six–item CI scale. As part of a mass–pretesting session at the beginning of the quar-
ter, we administered the CUS (α = .90), the six–item CI scale (α = .86), the BDI (α =
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1. For exploratory purposes, we ran our main analyses in Studies 1 and 2 using separate CU–own and
CU–other subscales. The anti–gambling essay could well trigger CU about one’s own and other people’s
outcomes among pro–gambling participants. Participants might consider the effects of gambling on soci-
ety as a whole and on their own lives (since the proposal was to introduce gambling into the state in
which they currently resided). We found that the effects associated with overall CU scores were best mir-
rored by CU–other scores in Study 1 and CU–own scores in Study 2. This is likely due to the fact that the
CU–other factor accounted for most of the scale variance in Study 1, whereas the CU–own factor ac-
counted for most of the scale variance in Study 2. Thus, the subscale that more closely related to overall
CU scores was the best substitute for overall CU scores. The differential weighting of the CU–own and
CU–other factors in the factor analyses might have been due to the conditions under which participants
completed the CU scale in Studies 1 and 2. In Study 1, the CU scale followed an attitude survey filler task.
In the prescreening sample used in Study 2, the CU scale followed the BDI. The BDI might have created a
greater focus on the self.
2. We also tested a four–factor model on the larger set of CU and CI items. The improvement in fit of the
four–factor model (RMSEA = .061) over the 3–factor model (RMSEA = .066) seemed negligible. In the
four–factor model, the selected six CI items still loaded (factor loadings > .30) on a single factor that was
uncorrelated with the CU–own and CU–other factors. However, three of the CI items that we had dis-
carded based on the 3–factor model loaded on a fourth factor. Two of these items referred to prediction in
the absence of causal understanding, so might have tapped a different construct.
.89), and the NCS (α = .88) to 310 male, 284 female, and 34 gender–unspecified
participants.
Using RAMONA (Browne, 2004), we conducted confirmatory factor analyses on
the 14 CU and six CI items. First, we specified a 3–factor model, with the six CI items
loading on a CI factor and the nine CU–own items (items 1–5, 7–9, 13) and 5
CU–other items (6, 10–12, 14) loading on separate CU factors (as in Edwards et al.,
1998). The RMSEA indicated that this model fit the data reasonably well (RMSEA =
.062). In addition, all of the estimated factor loadings were significant (all loadings
were > .37, ps < .001). The two CU factors were positively correlated, r = .84, p < .001,
whereas the CI factor was uncorrelated with CU about both one’s own, r = –.04, p =
.38, and other people’s, r = –.07, p = .11, outcomes.
A 2–factor model, with all 14 CU items loading on one factor and all six CI items
loading on a second factor, also provided a reasonable fit to the data (RMSEA =
.074). Again, all factor loadings were significant (all loadings were > .36, ps < .001)
and the CI and CU factors were uncorrelated, r = –.06, p = .19.
Next, we examined the association between CU, CI, BDI, and NCS scores. High
NCS individuals enjoy thinking and often engage in effortful cognitive activity
(Cacioppo et al., 1984). High CU individuals also are thought to engage in effortful
cognitive activity, but these efforts are geared specifically toward causal under-
standing and are motivated by attempts to regain lost control, not intrinsic enjoy-
ment (Weary & Edwards, 1996). Indeed, past research has found that high CU
individuals report lower need for cognition levels (Weary & Edwards, 1994). How-
ever, it seemed possible that those who generally like to think (high NCS) also
would value specific types of thought focused on analyzing the underlying causes
of events (high CI). To test this prediction, we regressed standardized NCS scores
on standardized CUS scores, CI scores, and their interaction. Only the main effects
of CU, β = –.10, t(624) = –2.42, p < .05, and CI, β = .14, t(624) = 3.55, p < .001, were sig-
nificant. As predicted, higher levels of CI and lower levels of CU were associated
with higher NCS scores.
Past research has established that a positive association exists between CU and
depression (Weary & Edwards, 1994) and between moderate depression and
thought about social information (Weary, Marsh, Gleicher, & Edwards, 1993). In
thinking about the possible relation between CI and depression, we predicted that
when individuals place a high value on causal understanding (high CI) and see
themselves falling short of their desired levels of understanding (high CU), the po-
tential for depression would increase (Hyland, 1987). We regressed standardized
BDI scores on standardized CUS scores, CI scores, and their interaction. This analy-
sis revealed main effects of CU, β = .51, t(624) = 15.12, p < .001, and CI, β = .13, t(624) =
3.80, p < .001. Higher CU and CI both were associated with greater depression. In
addition, the CU × CI interaction was significant, β = .09, t(624) = 2.88, p < .01. Simple
slope tests revealed that CI was associated with an increase in depression only
when individuals were high, one standard deviation (SD) above the mean in CU, β
= .22, t(624) = 4.37, p < .001.
Pilot Study 3
In the 0third pilot study, we administered the six CI items to 35 female and 44 male
participants twice: first as part of a mass pretesting questionnaire and then 7 weeks
later as a part of a seemingly unrelated study. The correlation between time 1 and
time 2 CI scores indicated adequate test–retest reliability, r = .63, p < .001. Weary and
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Edwards (1994) reported a similar level of test–retest reliability for the CUS over a
six–week interval, r = .62, p < .001. Overall, then, our measures of CU and CI ap-
peared to be internally consistent, reliable over time, and uncorrelated with each
other. Furthermore, the correlations between CI, NCS, and BDI scores support our
understanding of CI, yet are small enough not to threaten its status as a distinct
construct.
Pilot Study 4
Argument Quality and Type
For Study 1, we created four sets of anti–gambling arguments that differed in their
quality (strong or weak) and whether or not they identified causal mechanisms
(causal or non–causal). All argument sets contained an introductory statement, fol-
lowed by four claims about the negative consequences of gambling. We manipu-
lated argument quality by varying the strength of the consequences (Petty &
Wegener, 1991). In the strong argument condition, the consequences of gambling
were very undesirable: casinos were said to attract mainly in–state rather than
out–of–state customers, drive local businesses to bankruptcy, attract predomi-
nantly lower class patrons, and increase drug addiction and crime. In the weak ar-
gument condition, the consequences of gambling were only somewhat undesirable:
casinos were said to attract both in–state and out–of–state customers, take away
parking spaces from local businesses, attract predominantly middle class patrons,
and increase speeding and parking violations.
We manipulated argument type by varying the data presented to support these
claims (Slusher & Anderson, 1996). In the causal argument condition we explained
why the consequences would occur. In the non–causal argument condition we pro-
vided statistics that suggested that the negative effects would in fact occur. For in-
stance, to support the claim that casinos would attract predominantly lower class
patrons, the causal supporting data read, “This is because gambling offers low–in-
come people a chance at riches and a solution to financial hardship, and studies
show that the desire for positive outcomes and ‘feeling lucky’ blinds people to the
dismal chances they have of beating the odds,” whereas the non–causal supporting
data read, “At most of the country’s casinos, low–income people make up about
78% of the crowd at the slot machines, and studies on other types of gambling, such
as state lotteries, show that an unusually large number of the players are poor.”
We conducted a pilot study to ensure that when individuals were thinking care-
fully, our strong causal and non–causal arguments elicited predominantly favor-
able thoughts and our weak causal and non–causal arguments elicited
predominantly unfavorable thoughts (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Thirteen male, 44
female, and three gender–unspecified participants were randomly assigned to re-
ceive a message that contained strong or weak, causal or non–causal arguments.
Four participants’ data were excluded from analyses: three participants had al-
ready participated in the pilot study and one participant had extensive personal
experience with gambling.
Participants were told that the study was part of a research program that exam-
ines people’s perceptions of issues in the social world, and that they would read and
evaluate a short editorial piece. In addition, participants were told to think carefully
about and evaluate what was being said as they read the essay. Participants read
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one of the four essays, and then listed the thoughts they had while they were read-
ing the essay. They were told simply to write down the thoughts that came to their
minds, ignoring spelling, grammar, and punctuation (a phrase could be sufficient).
They were urged to be completely honest and list all thoughts they had. Further,
they were asked to list as many thoughts as they could, but to enter only one per box.
After listing their thoughts, participants rated on a 7–point scale how strong the ar-
guments were (1 = not at all strong, 7 = very strong).
Blind to condition, one of the authors and a research assistant independently
coded participants’ thoughts as favorable, unfavorable, or neutral/irrelevant with
regard to the advocacy (Cacioppo, Harkins, & Petty, 1981; Cacioppo & Petty, 1981;
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Interrater reliability was found to be high (Kappa = .78).
Thought indices were created based on each coder’s ratings by subtracting the
number of negative thoughts from the number of positive thoughts. Higher num-
bers indicated more favorable message–relevant thoughts. The indices for the two
raters were highly correlated (r = .93, p < .001), so they were averaged to form a
single measure of thought favorability.
A 2 (Argument Quality) × 2 (Argument Type) ANOVA on thought favorability
revealed a main effect of argument quality, F(1, 52) = 4.32, p < .05. As expected,
strong arguments elicited a more favorable thought profile (M = .46) than did the
weak arguments (M = –.93). Similarly, a 2 (Argument Quality) × 2 (Argument Type)
ANOVA on perceived strength ratings revealed a main effect of argument quality,
F(1, 52) = 5.04, p < .05. Strong arguments (M = 4.96) were rated as stronger than were
weak arguments (M = 4.07). For both measures, the argument type and Argument




One gender–unspecified, 190 male, and 149 female participants were randomly as-
signed to conditions in this 2 (Argument Type: Causal, Non–Causal) × 2 (Argument
Quality: Strong, Weak) between–subjects factorial design. CU and CI were assessed
at the end of the experimental session, after a filler task. The data from 41 partici-
pants had to be excluded for various reasons: 22 participants did not complete the
prescreening attitude measure, 13 participants skipped through one or more of the
main instruction screens or questions in fewer than 300 milliseconds (Bargh &
Chartrand, 2000), three participants had participated in Pilot Study 4, two partici-
pants had participated in an earlier session of the main study, and one participant
reported unintentionally clicking on the wrong answer for at least one of the de-
pendent measures. After these exclusions, the sample consisted of one
gender–unspecified, 160 male, and 138 female participants.
PRESCREENING DATA
We assessed initial attitudes toward the legalization of casino gambling in Ohio in a
mass prescreening session at the beginning of the quarter. Participants rated the ex-
tent to which they agreed with the proposal that casino gambling should be legal-
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ized in Ohio (1 = Do not agree at all, 7 = Agree completely), and how they felt about
legalizing casino gambling in Ohio on the following semantic differential scales:
good/bad, unfavorable/favorable, wise/foolish, harmful/beneficial. Ratings on
the five prescreening attitude items were reverse–scored and then averaged to form
a pre–message attitude index (α = .94). Higher numbers, then, indicated attitudes
that were consistent with the position advocated in the persuasive message
(anti–gambling).
PROCEDURE
Participants were assigned to individual computers that guided them through the
experiment. After completing some initial demographic information (gender, age,
initials, last four–digits of social security number), participants were told that they
would complete two different studies, and that they should read and follow all the
instructions carefully. They were told that the first study was part of a research pro-
gram that examines people’s perceptions of issues in the social world. The instruc-
tions emphasized that this is an important topic of scientific research, and that
learning more about how we make sense of issues involving others will help us
better understand and predict what will happen in the future. Participants were
told that they would be asked to read a short editorial piece written by a leading so-
cial scientist and then they would be asked to answer some questions about it.
Depending upon condition, we then presented participants with a set of strong or
weak, causal or non–causal arguments. These arguments were the same as those
used in the pilot study. In addition, to ensure that the arguments were taken seri-
ously, we attributed them to a high credibility source: Michael Thompson, Ph.D.,
from the Institute for the Study of Social Issues. This information was presented at
the top of the page containing the arguments.
Dependent Measures. Following the essay, participants were asked to report their
own opinion on the issue, as their personal views about the legalization of gambling
might have influenced their impressions of the essay. Participants again completed
the five attitude items from the prescreening questionnaire. Responses to these
items were reverse–scored and then averaged to form a post–message attitude in-
dex (α = .96). Participants then were informed that they had reached the end of the
first study.
CU and CI Scales. For the second study, participants were asked to complete some
questionnaires for researchers in the Psychology Department who were collecting
reliability and validity data on a number of scales. Participants first completed a
filler questionnaire (selected from Roese’s Political Attitude Filler Task, 2001), in
which they were asked to indicate their agreement with ten different statements
(i.e., “One should always be willing to admit mistakes,” “Taxes in America are too
high”). The filler task was used to take participants’ minds off the gambling essay so
that any temporary fluctuation in certainty that might have been caused by the per-
suasive message did not affect their responses to the CU and CI scales.
Next, participants completed the CUS (Weary & Edwards, 1994) and the six–item
CI scale. Responses to the CU items were summed together (α = .91), with higher
scores indicating higher levels of CU (M = 34.51, SD = 11.75). After reverse scoring
the appropriate CI item, responses to the six CI items were averaged together (α =
.85) to form a CI index (M = 4.40, SD = 0.98).
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RESULTS
CU AND CI SCORES
For all analyses that included continuous predictor variables, we standardized both
the continuous predictor and criterion variables prior to computing any interaction
terms. Similar to centering (Aiken & West, 1991), standardizing predictor variables
reduces multicollinearity. In addition, when both continuous predictor and crite-
rion variables are standardized, the unstandardized coefficients become the correct
standardized solutions (Friedrich, 1982).
To examine whether pre–message attitudes or experimental condition influenced
CU or CI scores, we regressed CU and CI scores on argument quality (–1 = weak, +1
= strong), argument type (–1 = non–causal, +1 = causal), pre–message attitudes, and
all interactions. This set of analyses revealed no significant effects on CU or CI
scores, ps > .17. Thus, even though we assessed CU and CI at the end of the study,
scores were not affected by any of our predictors.
ATTITUDES
Next, we regressed post–message attitudes on CU, CI, pre–message attitudes, argu-
ment type, argument quality, and all interactions. This analysis revealed main ef-
fects of argument quality, β = .12, t(267) = 2.62, p < .01, and pre–message attitudes, β
= .67, t(267) = 13.28, p < .001. In addition, the CI × Argument Quality, β = .10, t(267) =
1.96, p = .05, CU × CI, β = –.11, t(267) = –2.09, p < .05, CI × Pre–Message Attitude, β =
–.11, t(267) = –2.00, p < .05, CU × CI × Pre–Message Attitude, β = .14, t(267) = 2.49, p <
.05, CU × CI × Pre–Message Attitude × Argument Quality, β = –.14, t(267) = –2.43, p <
.05, CU × CI × Pre–Message Attitude × Argument Type, β = .11, t(267) = 1.98, p < .05,
and CU × CI × Pre–Message Attitude × Argument Type × Argument Quality, β =
–.21, t(267) = –3.68, p < .001, interactions were significant.
To investigate the nature of the highest order (5–way) interaction, we examined
whether the 4–way interaction of CU, CI, argument quality, and argument type was
significant at one standard deviation above and below the mean initial attitude
score (M = 3.70, SD = 1.53). Following Aiken and West’s (1991) recommendations
for simple slope tests, we transformed the initial attitude variable so that the level of
interest (i.e., + 1 SD, –1 SD) was set to zero. This way, we could examine whether the
CU × CI × Argument Quality × Argument Type interaction term was significant for
pro–gambling (– 1 SD) and anti–gambling (+1 SD) participants.
Pro–Gambling Participants. As predicted, the CU × CI × Argument Type × Argu-
ment Quality interaction was significant for the pro–gambling participants, β = .26,
t(267) = 3.25, p < 01. Next, we transformed the argument type variable so that we
could examine whether the CU × CI × Argument Quality interaction was significant
in either the causal or non–causal argument condition. As predicted, we observed a
significant CU × CI × Argument Quality interaction in the causal argument condi-
tion, β = .39, t(267) = 3.05, p < .01. The comparable interaction in the non–causal ar-
gument condition was not significant, β = –.13, t(267) = –1.35, p = .18.
To investigate the nature of the three–way interaction in the causal argument con-
dition (see the upper two graphs in Figure 1), we transformed the CU and CI vari-
ables and examined the effect of argument quality among high CU/high CI, high
CU/low CI, low CU/high CI, and low CU/low CI participants. These analysis re-
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vealed a significant effect of argument quality on post–message attitudes for partic-
ipants who were high in both CU and CI, β = .70, t(267) = 2.98, p < .01. As predicted,
these participants were significantly more persuaded when the causal arguments
were strong compared to weak. Argument quality did not significantly predict atti-
tudes for any other combinations of CU or CI, ps > .10.
Anti–Gambling Participants. Unexpectedly, the CU × CI × Argument Type × Argu-
ment Quality interaction also was significant, although opposite in sign, for the
anti–gambling participants, β = –.16, t(267) = –2.08, p < .05. Further analyses re-
vealed a significant CU × CI × Argument Quality interaction in the causal argument
condition, β = –.30, t(267) = –2.92, p < .01, but not in the non–causal argument condi-
tion, β = .01, t(267) = 0.12, p = .91. An examination of the CU × CI × Argument Quality
interaction in the causal argument condition (see the lower two graphs in Figure 1)
revealed that argument quality affected post–message attitudes among low
CU/high CI participants, β = .61, t(267) = 3.98, p < .001. Argument quality did not
significantly predict attitudes for other combinations of CU or CI, ps > .21.




























































































FIGURE 1. Persuasiveness of the causal arguments in Study 1 as a function of initial attitude, CU, CI, and argu-
ment quality.
Note. Higher numbers indicate greater persuasion.
DISCUSSION
Findings revealed that participants who had general doubts about their own grasp
on the underlying causes of events in the social world (high CU) and placed a high
value on causal understanding (high CI) attended carefully to a counterattitudinal
message that contained causal arguments. Accordingly, these participants were
more persuaded by strong compared to weak causal arguments. No effects of CU or
CI were observed when the arguments were non–causal.
Unexpectedly, anti–gambling participants who were low in CU and high in CI
also appeared to scrutinize the causal arguments. These participants should have
been experiencing the highest levels of confidence: their attitudes were consistent
with those of an expert and they generally felt confident in their understanding of
the causes of events. Although confidence has been linked in past literature to low
levels of elaboration (i.e., Tiedens & Linton, 2001), recent research has revealed that
confidence can increase message processing when the framing of the message
matches the perceiver’s level of confidence (Tormala, Rucker, & Seger, 2008). Spe-
cifically, Tormala et al. found that participants who were feeling confident thought
more about a message that promised to instill confidence than a message that did
not. They argued that the confidence framing increased the perceived relevance of
the message to the confident participants.
Although our message was not framed explicitly in terms of confidence, the
source expertise information likely set up an expectation that the message would
convey accurate information. Participants who were experiencing high levels of un-
certainty (high CU/counterattitudinal position) in a domain that they valued (high
CI) should have attended to the causal arguments in order to improve their causal
understanding. Participants who were experiencing high levels of confidence (low
CU/proattitudinal position) in a domain that they valued (high CI) might have at-
tended to the causal arguments in order to validate their causal understanding.
Thus, it appears that high levels of CI can increase attention to causal arguments
from an expert when they are coupled with strong feelings of either uncertainty or
confidence.
STUDY 2
In Study 2, we chose for several reasons to focus on extending our understanding of
the effect observed among high CU/high CI participants. First, this effect contrib-
utes to our understanding of CU reduction strategies. Second, from a practical
standpoint pulling individuals toward the other side of an issue can be more of a
challenge than “preaching to the choir.” Techniques that increase attention to
counterattitudinal appeals, then, can be quite valuable.
Study 1 provided evidence that pro–gambling/high CU/high CI participants
processed causal arguments in a thoughtful and discriminating manner, but it did
so by varying the strength of the consequences associated with gambling. We as-
sumed that the causal explanations themselves were scrutinized, but a direct ma-
nipulation of explanation quality would permit a stronger test of this prediction.
Accordingly, in Study 2, we held consequence strength and argument type constant
and manipulated explanation quality. Specifically, we always presented partici-
pants with very undesirable consequences of gambling (as in the strong argument
conditions in Study 1) and causal supporting evidence. However, we varied the
quality of the causal explanations.
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Our strong explanations provided reasonable causal accounts of why gambling
would result in undesirable consequences (i.e., drug addiction and crime will in-
crease because “at risk” people can’t stop gambling when their money runs out, and
will go into debt, steal money, and often turn to alcohol and drugs as a result of their
misfortune). Our weak explanations, on the other hand, provided less likely, less
satisfying, causal accounts (i.e., drug addition and crime will increase because casi-
nos convey an image of corruption and immorality; once people start to think of
their towns this way, they become more likely to use drugs and alcohol, and steal
money).
Since high CU/high CI participants only attended to the causal arguments when
they were favorably disposed toward gambling in Study 1, we only invited
pro–gambling students to participate in Study 2. Consequently, all participants
should find the anti–gambling arguments to be counterattitudinal; that, in turn,
should activate CU beliefs among high CU individuals. Those high CU individuals
who also place a high value on causal understanding (high CI) should respond by
scrutinizing the available causal explanations. Their desire for accurate causal ex-
planations and increased attention to the causal arguments should lead high
CU/high CI individuals to accept the arguments and change their attitudes only
when they are confident that the explanations are valid (Weary & Edwards, 1996;
Petty et al., 2002). Accordingly, we assessed participants’ confidence in the author’s
reasons in Study 2 and examined whether confidence mediated our predicted
effects on post–message attitudes.
Lastly, we included the BDI (Beck, 1967) in Study 2 so that we could examine
whether our predicted effects were due to depression, a construct that one of our pi-
lot studies revealed is associated with high levels of both CU and CI. However, we
thought that specific beliefs about one’s causal reasoning abilities (CU) and the im-
portance of causal understanding (CI), rather than depression, would affect partici-
pants’ attention to causal arguments.
PILOT STUDY
A pilot study was conducted to ensure that the strong and weak explanations were
noticeably different from each other. Fourteen male and 16 female participants
were randomly assigned to receive either strong or weak causal supporting evi-
dence. The data from two participants were excluded because they had extensive
prior experience with gambling.
As in the argument pilot for Study 1, participants were told that the study was
part of a research program that examines people’s perceptions of issues in the social
world, and that they would read and evaluate a short editorial piece. Participants
were told to think carefully about and evaluate the arguments that the author was
making and how well he was explaining the reasons behind what he was saying.
Participants next read either the strong or weak causal essay, presented on the
computer screen one sentence at a time. After they had finished reading the essay,
participants rated on 7–point scales how desirable the consequences of gambling
described in the essay were (extremely undesirable to extremely desirable) and
how well the author explained why the consequences might occur (not at all well to
extremely well).
One–way ANOVAs with explanation quality as a between–subjects factor were
conducted on consequence desirability and explanation quality ratings. A signifi-
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cant explanation quality effect emerged on perceived explanation quality, F(1, 26) =
12.34, p < .01. As expected, the strong explanations (M = 5.00) were rated as better
explaining why the consequences might occur than the weak explanations (M =
2.86). However, as we had intended, the consequences were seen as equally nega-
tive in the strong (M = 1.86) and weak (M = 2.21) explanation quality conditions, F(1,
26) = 0.61, p = .44.
METHOD
Prescreening Data
In a mass prescreening session at the beginning of the quarter, 43 gender–unspeci-
fied, 372 male, and 373 female participants completed a questionnaire packet con-
taining the BDI (Beck, 1967), the CU and CI scales, and the initial attitude items used
in Study 1. An attitude index was created by reverse scoring and then averaging the
five attitude items together (α = .94). Higher numbers, then, indicated less favorable
attitudes toward gambling. Only participants who were at or below the median on
the prescreening attitude index (Mdn = 3.40), were invited by email to participate in
Study 2.
The BDI (Beck, 1967) presents participants with 21 items that describe various
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors associated with depression (i.e., feeling sad,
guilty, disappointed in self, tired; decreased appetite, weight loss, difficulty sleep-
ing, thoughts of suicide). Participants rated each item on a scale of 0 to 3 based on
how they had been feeling during the past two weeks. For the participants who
completed the main study, responses were summed to create an index of depres-
sion (α = .81), where higher numbers indicated higher levels of depression (M =
6.39, SD = 5.18). Although the BDI cannot be used to diagnose depression, it is a
well–validated measure of depressive symptomatology (Beck, Steer, & Garbin,
1988).
Participants
The 40 male and 43 female participants recruited based on their favorable attitudes
towards gambling were randomly assigned to either the strong or weak causal ex-
planation condition.
Procedure
The procedure for Study 2 was identical to that used in Study 1 with the following
exceptions. First, the consequences of gambling always were very undesirable and
causal explanations always were presented. However, the quality of the explana-
tions was either strong or weak, depending upon condition. Second, after reading
the essay and completing the five attitude items, we asked participants to rate on
seven–point scales how confident they were in the reasons the author gave for why
each of the four specific consequences would occur (not at all confident to very con-
fident). Participants’ ratings were averaged (α = .76) to form a confidence index.
RESULTS
CU and CI Scores
We summed participants’ responses to the 14 CU items (α = .89) and averaged their
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responses to the six CI items (α = .81) to form indices of CU (M = 31.47, SD = 10.72)
and CI (M = 4.38, SD = 0.96). One–way ANOVAs revealed that random assignment
to conditions was effective and that CU and CI scores did not differ as a function of
explanation quality condition, ps > .73.
Attitudes
Responses to the five items were reverse–scored, and then averaged to form a
post–message attitude index (α = .94). We regressed post–message attitudes on ex-
planation quality, CU, CI, and all interactions. CU and CI were standardized and
explanation quality condition was effects–coded (+1 = strong, –1 = weak). This anal-
ysis yielded significant CU × Explanation Quality, β = 0.27, t(75) = 2.48, p < .05, and
CU × CI × Explanation Quality, β = 0.21, t(75) = 2.07, p < .05, interactions.
To examine the nature of the CU × CI × Explanation Quality interaction, we con-
ducted simple slope tests to examine the effects of explanation quality on post–mes-
sage attitudes at high (+1 SD) and low (–1 SD) levels of CU and CI. Simple slope tests
revealed a significant effect of explanation quality among two groups. As expected,
high CU/high CI participants were significantly more persuaded by the strong
compared to weak causal explanations, β = 0.48, t(75) = 2.22, p < .05. Low CU/high
CI participants, on the other hand, were significantly less persuaded by the strong
compared to weak causal explanations, β = –0.49, t(75) = –2.25, p < .05. (see Figure 2).
Confidence
Next, we examined participants’ confidence in the author’s reasons for why the
consequences would occur. We regressed the confidence index on CU, CI, explana-
tion quality, and all interactions. This analysis yielded only a significant CU × CI ×
Explanation Quality interaction, β = 0.21, t(75) = 2.07, p < .05.
We conducted simple slope tests to examine the effects of explanation quality on
post–message attitudes within level of CU (+1 SD, –1 SD) and CI (+1 SD, –1 SD).
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Strong Explanations Weak Explanations
FIGURE 2. Persuasion among participants in Study 2 as a function of CU, CI, and explanation quality. Note:











































These analyses revealed a significant explanation quality effect only among high
CU/high CI participants, β = 0.57, t(75) = 2.61, p < .05. These participants were more
confident in the author’s reasons when his explanations were strong compared to
weak (see Figure 3).
Mediational Analyses
Because we had obtained comparable effects on confidence in the author’s reasons
and post–message attitudes for high CU/high CI participants, we next examined
whether the effect on attitudes was mediated by confidence. We first examined
whether confidence mediated the three–way interaction on attitudes. Specifically,
we tested whether we had a case of mediated moderation (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt,
2005). If we did, we would have expected to see that (1) the CU × CI × Explanation
Quality interaction predicted the criterion (attitudes); (2) the CU × CI × Explanation
Quality interaction predicted the mediator (confidence in reasons); (3) the mediator
predicted the criterion when the effects of the other variables were controlled; and
(4) the inclusion of the mediator renders the CU × CI × Explanation Quality
interaction on post–message attitudes nonsignificant.
We have already presented analyses relevant to steps one and two. The CU × CI ×
Explanation Quality interaction significantly predicted post–message attitudes, β =
0.21, t(75) = 2.07, p < .05, and confidence in reasons, β = 0.21, t(75) = 2.07, p < .05. We
next examined whether our mediator (confidence) interacted with CU, CI, or expla-
nation quality to predict post–message attitudes. None of the interaction terms in-
volving confidence were significant: βs ranged from –.14 to .09, ts ranged from –1.11
to 0.81, ps > .26. Next, to provide evidence for the third and fourth steps, we re-
gressed the criterion (post–message attitudes) on the mediator (confidence in rea-
sons), while controlling for the other predictors: CU, CI, explanation quality, and all
interactions. This analysis revealed that confidence predicted post–message atti-
tudes, β = 0.43, t(74) = 4.11, p < .001, satisfying step 3. It also revealed that the CU × CI
× Explanation Quality interaction no longer predicted attitudes when the mediator
was included in the model, β = 0.12, t(74) = 1.26, p = .21, satisfying step 4. A Sobel test
(Preacher & Leonardelli, 2001; Sobel, 1982) revealed that the drop in significance of
the 3–way interaction was marginally significant, Z = 1.86, p = .06.
Next, we examined mediation for the particular group of interest. Recall that sim-
ple slope tests had revealed that among high CU/high CI participants, strong com-
pared to weak causal explanations led to significantly more persuasion, β = 0.48,
t(75) = 2.22, p < .05, and higher confidence, β = 0.57, t(75) = 2.61, p < .05. Subse-
quently, we entered confidence as a predictor of attitudes, along with the terms rep-
resenting high CU (i.e., transformed CU scores where one SD above the CU mean is
equal to zero), high CI (i.e., transformed CI scores where one SD above the CI mean
is equal to zero), explanation quality, and all interactions. When we controlled for
confidence, the explanation quality effect on post–message attitudes among high
CU/high CI participants became nonsignificant, β = 0.23, t(74) = 1.15, p = .25. An ad-
ditional Sobel test based on the simple slopes analyses revealed that the effect of ex-
planation quality for high CU/high CI participants was significantly reduced, Z =
2.21, p < .05, when we controlled for the main effect of confidence on attitudes.
Depression
Lastly, to examine whether the effects associated with CU and CI might be due to
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depression, we regressed post–message attitudes on BDI, explanation quality, and
the two way interaction. This analysis yielded no significant effects, ps > .12.
In order to examine whether BDI might interact with CU or CI to predict re-
sponses to message arguments, we regressed post-message attitudes on BDI, CU,
CI, explanation quality, and all interactions. Controlling for BDI, our predicted CU
× CI × Explanation Quality interaction remained significant, β = 0.25, t(67) = 2.14, p <
.05. Interestingly, the BDI × CU × CI × Explanation Quality interaction also was sig-
nificant, β = –0.34, t(67) = –2.27, p < .05.
Next, we transformed BDI scores so that we could examine our predicted 3–way
interaction among participants one SD above and below the BDI mean (M = 6.39, SD
= 5.18). These analyses revealed that our predicted 3–way interaction emerged pri-
marily among nondepressed participants, β = 0.58, t(67) = 2.74, p < .01. However, the
direction of the explanation quality effects for high CU/high CI and low CU/high
CI participants were the same for participants high and low in depression. High
CU/high CI participants were more persuaded by strong compared to weak causal
arguments, β = 1.04, t(67) = 2.03, p < .05 (nondepressed) and β = 0.35, t(67) = 1.43, p =
.16 (depressed). Low CU/low CI participants were less persuaded by strong com-
pared to weak causal arguments, β = –1.01, t(67) = –3.31, p < .01 (nondepressed) and
β = –0.10, t(67) = –0.31, p = .76 (depressed).
DISCUSSION
A number of important findings emerged from Study 2. First, we replicated our ef-
fects when the individual difference predictors (CU and CI) were assessed prior to
the experimental session. This helps rule out the possibility that CU and CI scores in
Study 1 were a reflection of, rather than contributors to, attitude change. Second, we
were able to show that depression, a construct that is positively associated with CU
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FIGURE 3. Confidence in the author’s reasons among participants in Study 2 as a function of CU, CI, and expla-
nation quality.
and CI, was not responsible for the observed effects. Rather, it was uncertainty
about why events happen in conjunction with high CI that increased the persua-
siveness of strong causal arguments. Depression did moderate, however, the ob-
served effects of CU, CI, and explanation quality. Our effects were observed
primarily among nondepressed participants. Although unanticipated, this effect is
consistent with the idea that high levels of depression (and negative expectancies
for goal attainment) can lead high CU individuals to disengage from efforts to
improve their causal understanding (Weary & Edwards, 1996).
Of greater theoretical interest, we found that individuals high in CU and CI scru-
tinized the quality of the causal explanations. High CU/high CI participants were
more confident in the strong compared to weak causal explanations, and were more
persuaded by them, as a result. Mediational analyses provided support for this pro-
cess. These results are consistent with recent metacognitive models of persuasion
which posit that confidence plays a critical role in persuasion among individuals
who are thinking carefully (Petty et al., 2002).
Unexpectedly, we found that low CU/high CI participants were more persuaded
by the weak compared to strong causal arguments. When presented with a poten-
tially serious negative consequence of gambling and a specious explanation, it is
possible that these participants spontaneously generated their own explanations.
High levels of confidence in their own causal explanations (due to low CU levels)
could have rendered these explanations more compelling than the author’s strong
causal explanations. This possibility is consistent with past findings in the areas of
self–persuasion (Janis & King, 1954; King & Janis, 1956) and spontaneous inferences
in persuasion (Kardes, 1988; Stayman & Kardes, 1992).3
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Extensions to the CU Model
The findings of the current set of studies have implications for the CU model
(Weary & Edwards, 1996). Findings are consistent with the idea that high CU indi-
viduals use other people’s causal explanations to help reduce their CU feelings and
gain a sense of understanding, at least when high CU individuals are also high in CI.
Importantly, high CU individuals’ chronic lack of confidence in their own explana-
tions does not appear to compromise their ability to detect specious causal explana-
tions offered by others. They feel confident in and accept other people’s
explanations only when the explanations are plausible.
An important issue highlighted by the current research is the moderating role
that CI plays in CU–reduction efforts. Only one previous study has examined the
influence of CU and CI on social judgments (Weary et al., 2001, Study 2). Using a
single–item measure of CI, that study found that when participants with a high
level of CU, CI, or experimentally–induced accuracy motivation were asked to
judge an ambiguous case of academic misconduct, they were not influenced by an
available stereotype. In contrast to Weary et al. (2001), we found that different com-
binations of CU and CI affected judgments in different ways. In comparing the re-
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3. Our confidence measure referred specifically to confidence in the author’s reasons, so it would not
have been sensitive to confidence in one’s own explanations. This is probably why we did not observe an
explanation quality effect on confidence among low CU/high CI participants.
sults of the different studies, it is important to note that lack of stereotype use in
Weary et al.’s (2001) study does not necessarily indicate higher levels of elaboration.
Indeed, recent research suggests that automatic vigilance to social information
among high CU participants can dilute the judgmental impact of a stereotype even
when individuals are unable to engage in effortful processing (Tobin, Weary,
Brunner, Han, & Gonzalez, 2007).
With a clearer indication of elaboration in the current studies (i.e., sensitivity to
argument quality), we found the effects of CU and CI to be more circumscribed. We
found evidence of increased elaboration of causal arguments among high CU/high
CI participants who received a counterattitudinal message (Studies 1 and 2) and
low CU/high CI participants who received a proattitudinal message (Study 1). In
our studies, then, high CI was necessary but not sufficient for increased processing
of causally–relevant information. In addition, we posited that low CU/high CI par-
ticipants may have spontaneously generated their own causal explanations when
they received a counterattitudinal message containing weak causal explanations
(Study 2). Future research will have to examine the processes underlying these
unexpected CI effects among low CU participants.
Extensions to the Persuasion Literature
Researchers have found that uncertainty stemming from specific emotions
(Tiedens & Linton, 2001) can increase the amount of thought individuals devote to a
persuasive message, leading them to change their attitudes more in response to
strong compared to weak arguments. Similarly, researchers have also found that in-
consistencies between old and new attitudes (Petty, Tormala, Briñol, & Jarvis, 2006)
or implicit and explicit self–conceptions (Briñol, Petty, & Wheeler, 2006) can in-
crease individuals’ processing of relevant information. These findings suggest that
individuals will process persuasive messages carefully if the message potentially
could help perceivers reduce their uncertainty. Our own findings extend this gen-
eral principle to the causal domain. We found that high CU individuals thought
carefully about our counterattitudinal message only when it contained causal
arguments and only when they were high in CI.
We should acknowledge that one limitation of the current research is that we only
presented participants with arguments against gambling. Would we have found
parallel effects if we had used arguments in favor of gambling? Based on a review of
the attribution literature, Weiner (1985) argued that spontaneous causal thinking is
greatest in response to negative and unexpected events. However, more recent re-
search has revealed that unexpected events lead to more spontaneous attributional
activity than do expected events, regardless of event valence (Kanazawa, 1992).
Event valence seems to affect only nonspontaneous attributional activity. Specifi-
cally, Kanazawa (1992) found that participants generated more causal attributions
when they were asked why negative events occurred, compared to why positive
events occurred.
It is likely that our causal persuasive messages elicited both spontaneous and
nonspontaneous attributional activity, so valence and expectancies both should
have played a role. In general, then, we would expect that CU and CI would have
the strongest effect on message processing when the arguments address the causes
of unexpected negative events, as they did in the current set of studies. Unexpected
negative events can be very costly, so it would be reasonable for high CU/high CI
individuals to focus their efforts on such events.
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Overall, our findings support the utility of causal arguments for changing peo-
ple’s attitudes and beliefs (Slusher & Anderson, 1996). However, we found that
such arguments received the most attention when individuals were highly moti-
vated to understand the causes of events (high CI) and highly doubtful (high
CU/counterattitudinal message). We also found some evidence to suggest that
high CI increased attention to causal arguments when individuals were highly con-
fident (low CU/proattitudinal message). Importantly, for these groups of individu-
als, we saw that causal arguments had their effect on persuasion through the central
route. According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and
the Heuristic Systematic Model (Chaiken, 1987), such persuasion is likely to be long
lasting rather than transitory. It would be worthwhile, then, for future research to
examine strategies for temporarily altering perceivers’ levels of CU and CI before
presenting them with causal arguments.
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